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If you thought that you were making your way to where the puzzles and pagans lay 
I will put it together  
– it is a strange conversation 
Beck Hansen (‘Jack-Ass’), modified. 
Introduction: solving an inconclusive eristic argument
In the Physics, Aristotle describes Parmenides’ arguments as eristic (185a8-10, 186a6-8). 
Now, arguments turn out to be eristic if they purposely either assume some premise which 
seems to be good (i.e., true or acceptable) without being so, or if they seem to deduce their 
conclusion without doing so – or if they have both flaws (see Topics 100b23-26). Aristotle is 
very assertive about Eleatic arguments (both Melissus’ and Parmenides’) satisfying both 
descriptions: they assume false premises (185a9-10, 186a7) and they are inconclusive 
(asullogistoi, 185a10, 186a8). Aristotle explicitly charges Melissus with a fallacy of 
conversion – the paralogism of the consequent (167b17-20, 168b37-38).  As for Parmenides, 1
it is not so clear what is exactly the argument that is exposed as both having a false 
premise and being inconclusive. 
Aristotle’s main discussion of Parmenides’ argument is found in the section 186a22-b14 
(with what seems to be its main part in 186a23-32). It is not easy to parse Aristotle’s train 
 This is right about the paralogism of the consequent, but it is not so clear how Aristotle takes the other Melissus’ 1
arguments as fallacious. See Clarke 2019, p. 62-73; Castelli 2018, p. 84. About Melissos and Aristotle, see Brémond 
2017 (especially p. 27-48).
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of thought. He never presents a full formulation of Parmenides’ argument: he starts with 
saying what sort of solution (λύσις) should be applied to block the argument. But, instead 
of sticking exactly to the original terms of Parmenides’ argument in expounding his 
solution, Aristotle proposes a parallel argument in which the term ‘white’ replaces ‘being’. 
The parallel argument itself is difficult to disentangle and parse. Although it is clear which 
is the main premise that Aristotle takes to be false (since he clearly says so, 186a24-25), it is 
not so clear how and why Aristotle considers the argument to be inconclusive. 
The text runs as follows:
T1: ‘The solution is that he assumes what is not true and infers what does not follow. 
His false assumption is that things are said to be in only one way, when they are said to be 
in many. As for the invalidity, suppose we say that there are only pale things, and that 
‘pale’ means only one thing: the pale things will be none the less many and not just one. 
The pale will not be one in virtue of being continuous, nor will it be one in account. For the 
being of pale will be different from the being of that which has received it. By that I do not 
imply that anything can be separately apart from the pale: it is not because they can be 
separated, but because they differ in their being, that the pale and that to which it belongs 
are different. This, however, is something Parmenides did not get far enough to 
see’ (Charlton’s translation, slightly modified).
I have only taken Charlton’s translation to start with, for any translation depends on 
parsing the argument. An important remark is that I replaced ‘answer’ (which is too 
general) with ‘solution’ as a translation of ‘λύσις’: I argue that ‘λύσις’ is employed as the 
technical term coming from Sophistical Refutations (179b18-21, 24-26; 176b29-177a6; 
170b3-5). Aristotle has depicted Parmenides’ argument with two main features that are 
characteristic of eristic arguments  (more on this below). Even if Parmenides’ argument is 
not fully eristic or sophistic in the sense that it does not have the purpose of producing a 
false semblance of being knowledgeable, the fact that it has those two main features allows 
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us to understand Aristotle’s solution along the lines he has developed in Sophistical 
Refutations. 
Now, any intepretation of Parmenides’ argument must meet some desiderata – the first 
of which is, of course, to meet the description of eristic arguments Aristotle has alluded to 
previously (185a8-10, 186a6-8). Thus:
(D1) at least one premise in Parmenides’ argument must be false; 
(D2) the argument itself must be inconclusive.
But a third desideratum is to meet Aristotle’s explanation in 186a28-31 about what was 
wrong with the logical steps of the argument or, in other words, Aristotle’s solution (λύσις) 
for its inconclusiveness. Thus: 
(D3) Parmenides’ argument must meet Aristotle’s solution (λύσις) for its 
inconclusiveness.
In order to understand desideratum (D3), it is important to stress what a solution 
consists in – for Aristotle has said very clearly that ‘not every exposure of a defect [i.e., in 
an eristic fallacy] constitutes a solution’ (179b18, Hasper’s translation). There are two sorts 
of solution: if the argument is conclusive but concludes something false, the solution 
consists in spotting the false premise(s) on which the falsity of the conclusion depends.  2
But, if the argument is inconclusive, the solution consists in spotting the factor on which 
the inference has failed – the factor on which the false appearance of an inferential success 
depends.  A solution, in this latter case, does not consist merely in spotting or telling that 3
an argument is inconclusive. A solution consists in identifying what is exactly the 
inconclusive step or, in other words, identifying the logical factor on which the 
 See Sophistical Refutations 176b35-36. These cases can overlap with those in An. Priora II.18 (66a16-24). 2
 See Sophistical Refutations 176b36, 179b18-21, 24-26; Topics 160b23-25, 33-35. See in this direction Smith 1997, p. 3
137; Fait 2007, p. 204; Rossi 2017, p. 214. I do not take the case described in Topics VIII.10 (160b26-33) as equivalent 
to those in An. Priora II.18 (66a16-24). In the latter case, we have the formal schema of valid arguments with (at least) 
one false premise. But, in the former case, one of the premises is not merely false, but deceptive in the sense of 
producing a false permission for the inference (ψεῦδος can encode both meanings, ‘false’ and ‘inferentially-deceptive’). 
Thus, in this case, the solution does not consist merely in rejecting the premise as false (in the truth-functional sense) 
but in explaining why it is inferentially-deceptive (160b37).
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inconclusiveness depends. Thus, one cannot yet be said to have solved an inconclusive 
argument if all she has done was to tell that the conclusion is false and compatible with the 
truth of the premises. In order to solve an inconclusive argument, one has to detect exactly 
what is the fallacious step or factor on which the inconclusiveness rests.
Let me dwell on that point. Consider the following inconclusive argument (I will 
employ arguments with syllogistic form just for didactic purposes, without implying that 
fallacies must have such a form): 
[fallacy 1]: ‘every horse is a mammal; every horse is an animal; therefore, every animal 
is a mammal’.
Exposing the inconclusiveness of this argument does not consist in merely spotting that 
the conclusion is false and that its falsity is compatible with the truth of the premises. One 
must do more than that: one must identify where exactly the logical mistake lies. In order 
to support this point, let us take an argument with the same form but a true conclusion: 
[fallacy 2]: ‘every horse is an animal; every horse is a mammal; therefore, every 
mammal is an animal’. 
In this case, it is impossible to follow the same procedure to expose the inconclusiveness 
of the argument, namely, to state that the conclusion is false etc. – for the conclusion is 
certainly true, although it has not been deduced from the premises. Consider also an 
inconclusive argument with a different form: 
[fallacy 3]: ‘every mammal is an animal, every horse is an animal; therefore, every horse 
is a mammal’.
Again, in this case too, it is impossible to expose the inconclusiveness of the argument 
by stating that the conclusion is false – for the conclusion is true. Now, the same general 
description applies to both fallacy 2 and fallacy 3: their conclusions are true, but have not 
been deduced from their premises. However, the sort of logical mistake is different in each 
case. Fallacy 3 is a fallacy of the consequent depicted as a pseudo-syllogism in the second 
figure. But fallacy 2 is not the same sort of fallacy and is rather represented as a pseudo-
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syllogism in the third figure. Now, in order to have a solution for an inconclusive 
argument, one has to explain exactly which is the sort of logical mistake that has been 
performed in the inferential step. (It is immaterial to my point to discuss what the 
explanation would be in my examples).
Consider the sophistical argument Aristotle has introduced in Topics VIII.10:
[fallacy 4]: ‘he who is seated is writing; Socrates is seated; therefore, Socrates is 
writing’ (160b26-28).
The first premise (which is the premise on which the deceptiveness of the argument 
depends, cf. 160b28-33) was true at a given context, when it referred to someone who was 
indeed seated and writing. However, the solution does not consist merely in spotting 
someone who, by being seated but not writing, makes the premise false. The solution, I 
submit, consists in explaining that the sophist, taking advantage of the first context (in 
which the premise was true), has made the premise appear as a general rule about 
everyone who happens to be seated, as if its content were this: ‘whoever is seated is 
writing’ or ‘every seated person is writing’.4
Now, it is far from clear what exactly Aristotle’s solution (λύσις) is for the 
inconclusiveness of Parmenides’ argument. My next sections will be devoted to 
disentangling Aristotle’s solution and, consequently, to showing how Parmenides’ 
argument meets the third desideratum. 
The parallel argument with ‘leukon’
One thing, at least, is clear: one of the premises of the parallel argument is this:
‘“white” signifies one’. 
 On this, see Smith 1997, p. 137.4
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But it is far from clear what sort of semantic relation is captured with the expression 
‘signifying one’ (semainontos henos,186a26-27). I will return to this question below, but for 
the time being I wish to focus on the inconclusiveness of the argument.
What exactly is the argument Aristotle has taken to be inconclusive? And how does it 
come to be inconclusive? One thing seems clear: the problematic move in the argument is 
to arrive at the notion of being one from the notion of signifying one.  However, given 5
Aristotle’s depiction, it is not possible to reconstruct the argument on the following lines:
(i) if ‘X’ signifies one, then X is one;
(ii) ‘white’ [or ‘being’] signifies one;
(iii) therefore, white [or being] is one.
To be sure, Aristotle would consider premise (i) as false (for any interpretation of 
‘signifying one’ and of ‘X’), but he will take the argument as valid. It would not work to 
object that Aristotle’s logical system has not ascribed any significant role to modus ponens 
and other forms of propositional calculus. For Aristotle’s general theory of argumentation 
(as found in the Topics and Sophistical Refutations) is perfectly sensitive to those kinds of 
valid argument.  6
My proposal starts with getting rid of premise (i) above – for it would play a validating 
role as an inference permit for the conclusion – and sticking with what remains:
(1) ‘white’ signifies one;
(2) therefore, white is one.
 See Castelli 2010, p. 76; Quarantotto 2019, p. 95.5
 This is a modest sample of passages: Topics 108b12-19; 111b17-23; 112a16-21; 124b7-14; An. Post. 47a28-35.6
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Thus, my proposal is to concentrate on this one-premise invalid sort of inference. As for 
the sentence ‘if only the white things were taken’ (εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, 186a26), I 
can be content either with saying that it is not an actual premise of the parallel argument 
or, if it is a premise, it is not the most important for Aristotle’s solution: the logical mistake 
does not rest on it (more on this below). What is really important in that sentence is the 
expression ‘μόνα’ (only), which tells us that Aristotle is focusing exclusively on white 
things without paying attention to any other feature that might happen to accompany 
white things.  His point is highlighted again in 186a29-30: ‘there will not be any other 7
thing separated apart from the white’. The last sentence plays other roles too (more on this 
below), but it also works as a reminder that the parallel argument, in assuming that the 
term ‘white’ is to be applied to one thing, has not assumed that that thing would have in 
principle other features which could be picked up by terms different from ‘white’, nor has 
it assumed that there might be other things besides that white thing.
Therefore, if the sentence in 186a26 is not taken as a premise in the argument itself, it 
would still pay the bill by describing some auxiliary conditions on which the argument is 
proposed.  Its message would be something like this: ‘let us focus exclusively on the 8
domain of white things, taking it as if it were the only existing domain, in order to spot the 
parallelism with being’. But, if the sentence is taken as a premise in the argument, it does 
not matter for my purposes. For, as I will argue, that sentence does not contain the factor 
on which the logical mistake Aristotle identifies in Parmenides’ inconclusive argument 
depends – that sentence is not what Aristotle identifies as the factor ‘παρ᾽ ὃ γίνεται τὸ 
ψεῦδος’ (160b34; 176b34; 179b19-20) – so that it is immaterial for Aristotle’s solution to 
reject it – even if it is false, as indeed it is (cf. 160b23-25, 33-35). Thus, in order to 
understand Aristotle’s solution for Parmenides’ argument, I will concentrate on premise 
(1) above, for that premise is surely the one on which the logical mistake depends.
 See on a similar direction Castelli 2018, p. 92.7
 For other options, see Clarke 2019, p. 87, Castelli 2018, p. 87-92, Quarantotto 2019, p. 96.  8
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Another problem for interpreting Parmenides’ argument is that Aristotle’s objection at 
186a28 is double – ‘the white will not be one in virtue of being continuous, nor will it be 
one in account’ –, which might be taken to imply that Parmenides’ argument has targeted 
two different conclusions: that Being is one by continuity, and that Being is one in account. 
Perhaps these two different conclusions are indeed tracking different claims which can be 
found in Parmenides’ poem.  However, there is no room to develop here interesting issues 9
about how these two different conclusions are (or can be) related to each other. As for 
Aristotle’s solution in 186a27-32, I argue that it is most focused on the conclusion that 
Being is one in account, which is what will motivate the ensuing remarks about 
signification (186a32-34ff.). Aristotle’s objection in terms of continuity holds in itself, but, 
as I will show, it does not work as a proper solution for Parmenides’ inconclusive step. 
Indeed, when saying that ‘the white will not be one by being continuous’ (186a28), 
Aristotle can be taken in two ways. He might be arguing that ‘white’ is applicable to many 
instances that are not continuous with each other – as, e.g., two white horses are not 
continuous with each other, nor are they continuous with white walls.  Or he might be 10
arguing that any instance of whiteness will be a body and, being a body, will be 
continuous and, being continuous, will be liable to infinite division – even if it were the 
only white thing in the world. Thus, even if there were only one individual instance of 
whiteness, the white thing would not be one in the sense required by Parmenides because 
it would have potentially infinite parts – and having only two parts would be enough for 
generating multiplicity in a way undesired by Parmenides.
This objection to the conclusion that Being is one by continuity would stand on several 
possible interpretations of what ‘signifying one’ amounts to in premise (1). If ‘signifying 
one’ is taken in terms similar to the notion of reference, the argument might be 
paraphrased along the following lines:
 See Clarke 2019, p. 94-97, for this analysis (based on B 8.22-25 from Parmenides’ poem).9
 See the same intuition about ‘being continuous’ in Castelli 2010, p. 77; Clarke 2019, p. 105. Aristotle has already 10
made the point about continuity in 185b9-11.
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(1a) ‘white’ refers to only one thing;
(2a) therefore, white is [only] one [entity] by continuity.
But if ‘signifying one’ is taken in terms similar to the notion of meaning, the argument 
could be paraphrased rather along the following lines:
(1b) ‘white’ has only one meaning;
(2b) therefore, white is [only] one [entity] by continuity.
In that case, it would be claiming that having one single meaning leads to having just 
one referent (one single instantiation).11
But note that the argument might be construed without deciding these options for 
interpreting ‘signifying one’:
(1c) ‘white’ has only one meaning or refers to only one thing (or both);
(2c) therefore, white is [only] one [entity] by continuity.
Now, the three suggested construals – in terms of (1a)-(2a) to (1c)-(2c) – might deliver 
defensible interpretations of the inconclusiveness of the argument. However, I argue that 
they do not deliver the best story about Aristotle’s solution for the inconclusiveness of the 
argument – and, as I said, there are two different things, first, detecting that the argument 
is inconclusive, second, identifying the logical factor that explains why it is inconclusive.
On any of the suggested interpretations, the argument will be moving from a premise 
that deals with the nature of signification (whatever that means) to arrive at a conclusion 
 I have adopted this view in Angioni 2009, p. 99-100. See also Castelli 2010, p. 77: ‘Unity of meaning does not imply 11
that there exists exactly one thing which is denoted by the term at issue rather than a multiplicity of beings each falling 
under the concept signified by the term’ (my italics). But Castelli 2018, p. 87-93, has a different story. 
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involving the nature of being as a continuous entity. I am not saying that there is 
something intrinsically wrong with such an interpretation of the argument. But I believe 
that Aristotle’s solution concentrates on the other conclusion, namely, that Being is one in 
account. Perhaps Aristotle has preferred this other conclusion to expound his solution 
because, otherwise, he would have to rely on too many extra assumptions – about the 
nature of the bodies and the nature of the continuous etc. Besides, the interpretations 
suggested above depict Parmenides’ argument as an inference that starts from the nature 
of signification and claims to attain something involving the nature of bodies or the nature 
of continuity. Now, signification is a general phenomenon involving our employment of 
terms to talk about things in the world, but oneness by continuity covers only a partial 
aspect of how things are in the world. Thus, I submit that it is most appropriate for 
Aristotle’s solution to prefer (as his main target) an argument that starts from the nature of 
signification and attempts to conclude something about how things in general are in the 
world and in their most general relation to our language. And this explains why Aristotle 
prefers the conclusion ‘white [or Being] is one in account’.
Thus, Aristotle’s preferred solution concedes (for the sake of the argument) two 
Parmenidean assumptions in order to rest on what is most important. According to that 
solution, even if there were just one individual white thing (first concession to 
Parmenides), with no other feature besides being white (second concession to Parmenides) 
– and even being indivisible (third concession) –, that white thing would not be one in 
account (λόγῳ, 186a28).
In Aristotle’s jargon, the dative expression ‘in account’ (λόγῳ, 186a28) – applied either 
to ‘one’ (ἕν) or to ‘same’ (ταὐτόν) or to its opposites – captures the intensional aspect 
under which something is being considered within a given situation. Thus, the expression 
applied in this way usually maps what it is for something to be such and such, where 
‘being such and such’ can point to any feature that something happens to have. In our 
present context, the expression points to what it is to be white (τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ, 186a29) 
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and what it is to be the receptacle of whiteness ([τὸ εἶναι] τῷ δεδεγμένῳ, 186a29) or, in 
other words, to be the whatever-it-is that happens to be characterised as white. (And I 
believe that, in the context of his solution, Aristotle does not need to take this receptacle in 
terms of being a surface, as he indeed takes it in his positive theory of coloured things etc. 
All he needs is to take the receptacle as the whatever-it-is that happens to be characterised 
as white) . I suggest that this distinction is Aristotle’s solution.  And this is what we 12 13
should expect, for Aristotle says in Sophistical Refutations (176b36) that eristic, inconclusive 
arguments must be solved by distinctions.
Now, Aristotle cannot just be saying that this distinction is fundamental although 
Parmenides has ignored it. This distinction is indeed fundamental, and Parmenides has 
indeed ignored it. But Aristotle’s solution cannot be just this double statement – for a 
solution does not consist in just pointing out that Parmenides had a false conclusion etc. If 
Aristotle’s insistence on the distinction really works as a solution of an inconclusive argument, 
Aristotle’s point must be that, contrary to Parmenides’ inferential claim, the notion of 
signifying one (as asserted in the premise) does not entail the notion of being one in 
account (as asserted in the conclusion) – in other words, the notion of signifying one 
(asserted in the premise) does not entail the notion of being one in such a way that there 
will be no distinction between being white and being the receptacle (i.e., being the whatever-
it-is that is characterised as white). Thus, Parmenides’ inconclusive step did claim (on 
Aristotle’s construal) that signifying one entails the sort of unity or identity in account that 
is incompatible with the distinction between being F and being the receptacle of F.  This is, 14
 For a similar point, see Clarke 2019, p. 110-1.12
 This distinction is also central in I.7, 190a13-17 and arguably in I.8 too. Although Aristotle does not resort to the 13
locutions ‘λόγῳ’ and ‘τῷ εἶναι’ in I.8, I submit that the distinction between the physician qua physician and the 
physician taken ‘κατὰ συµβεβηκός’, (namely, according to one of her attributes that fails to be the most important for 
her being a physician) can ultimately be translated in terms of a distinction ‘λόγῳ’ and ‘τῷ εἶναι’. This result depends 
on my interpretation of what ‘κατὰ συµβεβηκός’ means, so there is no room to develop it here. For a similar point, see 
Anagnostopoulos 2013, p. 251-2. I believe other approaches are not incompatible with that view (Clarke 2015, p. 140; 
Kelsey 2006, p. 338-354; Morison 2019).
 Clarke (2019, p. 115) suggests that ‘mounogenes’ in Parmenides’ poem can be taken as Aristotle’s ‘one in account’.14
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therefore, on the right track to explain how Parmenides’ argument meets the desideratum 
(D3). A reasonable paraphrasis can start along the following lines (but this will not be the 
end of the story):
(1d) ‘white’ signifies one (whatever that means: has only one meaning or refers to only 
one thing or both);
(2d) therefore, white is one in account (λόγῳ).
In order to understand Aristotle’s solution, let us keep our assumptions at the 
minimum: take only one thing that happens to be white and only white (cf. 186a29-30). 
Even if that thing were an indivisible body (concession to Parmenides), even if that thing 
had only the characteristic of being white and nothing else (concession to Parmenides), it 
would still hold that, for that very same thing, being white will be different from being 
whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-white. More importantly, on the counterfactual situation 
proposed just for the sake of the argument, it will be true that ‘white’ signifies one both as 
having just one meaning and as having just one referent – but its signifying one in that 
way would not entail that there is no distinction between being white and being whatever-
it-is-that-happens-to-be-white. 
Aristotle stresses that the distinction between being white and being its receptacle does 
not need to rest on any separability between them.  As I suggested, the sentence ‘there 15
will be nothing separated besides the whiteness’ (186a29-30) does double duty: on the one 
hand, Aristotle thereby reminds us that, for his solution to work, there is no need to take 
some other feature distinct from being white (‘there will be no other feature besides the 
whiteness’), but, on the other hand, Aristotle stresses that there is no need to take the 
receptacle itself as separate or separable from the whiteness (‘there is no need to take 
something – not even the receptacle – as separable from the whiteness’). Even if that 
 For a similar point see Castelli 2010, p. 76-7, Quarantotto 2019, p. 97, Clarke 2019, p. 113. On this point, I disagree 15
with Bostock 2006, p. 108.
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receptacle were destined to be white to eternity, and even if being white were destined to 
be present only in that single receptacle to eternity – with the result that being white and 
being that receptacle were mutually convertible – they would still be different from each 
other. ‘For the white and what it is present in are different from each other not as separable 
but in virtue of what they are (τῷ εἶναι)’ (186a30-31). And this is the most important point 
Parmenides has not seen.16
The solution to an eristic inconclusive argument:
How does this distinction work as a solution to Parmenides’ inconclusive step? Recall 
that, on my proposal, Parmenides’ inconclusive step can be plausibly depicted as if it were 
a one-premise inference – a fallacy analogous to a fallacious conversion of a negative 
universal predication:
‘No man is oviparous’; therefore, ‘some oviparous is a man’.
If Aristotle were to expose where the mistake lies, if he were to identify the factor on 
which the fallacious conversion depends, what would he have done? I suggest that 
Aristotle would have resorted to the dictum de nullo and would have explained that 
whoever has made the fallacious conversion did not understand what exactly the dictum 
de nullo means. Now, the dictum de nullo means that, for any A said of no B, ‘no B can be 
found of which A is predicated’ . Thus, if someone says that ‘no man is oviparous’, this 17
means that no man can be found of which oviparous is predicated. Now, if there were 
some oviparous of which man were predicated (as the fallacious conversion claimed), 
there would be a man of which oviparous were predicated, so that (contrary to what the 
dictum de nullo means) it would not be true that no man can be found of which oviparous is 
predicated (cf. Analytica Priora 25a15-17). Aristotle’s solution would consist in saying that 
 Parmenides’ oversight is described with the verb ‘συνορᾶν’ (‘συνεώρα’ at 186a32), the same verb employed several 16
times in Topics (e.g. 100b30, 105b11, 158a4, 5, 10; 160a29; 163b10) to describe the ability of a dialectical answerer to 
find an objection and/ or to see the consequences of what has been accepted. See also a funny use of the verb in Gen. 
Anim. 756b8.
 Striker 2009, p. 84.17
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whoever has made the fallacious conversion has employed a notion (‘predicating A of no 
B’) without understanding what it implies or what exactly it amounts to. 
I suggest that a similar thing is going on when Aristotle presents his compressed 
solution to Parmenides’ inconclusive step. Parmenides has employed the notion of 
‘signifying something’ without understanding what it implies or what exactly it involves 
or what exactly it amounts to. Several employments of ‘signifying’ (σημαίνειν) can be 
found in ordinary Greek and in Aristotle’s language.  But there is one employment which 18
is central for our passage: signifying as something we do when employing our language to 
convey something about the world. When we do that, a term – let us take ‘F’  – is 
employed in such a way that ‘F’ points to a given thing that is (taken to be) F. Thus, saying 
that ‘the term “white” signifies something’ amounts to saying that ‘white’ is employable to 
pick out a given thing that is (taken to be) white. And this is enough for Aristotle’s 
solution – for this is what Parmenides did not understand. It does not matter whether that 
thing has other features besides being white. It does not matter whether that thing is or is 
not the only white thing in the world. It does not matter whether that thing is a continuous 
or an indivisible body. If ‘white’ signifies something, ‘white’ points to a given thing that has 
the feature of being white. Even if ‘white’ signifies one single thing etc., ‘white’ is pointing 
to a given thing that has the feature of being white – so that being white and being 
whatever it is that has whiteness are distinct in being and count as two in account. As I will 
explore below, this fundamental point is stressed in Aristotle’s next step (186a32-34). 
What Parmenides did not understand is that terms introducing a given feature such as 
‘white’ (or ‘being’) introduce it as something different from the underlying thing it is 
 Ancient Greek usage of ‘σηµαίνειν’ is a mess. The verb ‘σηµαίνειν’ can be assigned to (i) things (like in ‘smoke 18
indicates fire’), (ii) human agents (cf. 15b30) and (iii) linguistic entities. (i) is irrelevant for our purposes. But a bunch 
of several relations can be found within the general classes (ii) and (iii). Thus, ‘σηµαίνειν’ can cover (depending of the 
context): the relation between a word and its meanings (16a17; 1019b32), the relation between a word and its fixed 
class of referents, independently of any particular utterance (1b26; 103b27, 31, 33, 35; 1024b14); the relation between a 
description and its referent (102a2); the relation between a word and its referent in a particular context (e.g., 103a39); 
the relation between a word, its core meaning and the thing targeted in a given sentence or, in other words, what a 
predicate says about its subject when it is predicated (103b28 [the first occurrence], 103b37; 132a2; 83a24ff.; 
1006a29ff.); the relation between a sentence and its general meaning (20b2); the relation between a sentence and its 
meaning in particular contexts of utterance (e.g., 130a20; 166a25, 28), etc. For a helpful survey, see Castelli 2018, p. 
87-88.
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predicated of. Thus, even if the underlying thing and the feature were inseparable (in any 
way of being inseparable, e.g., physically or conceptually or both etc.), they will still be 
different from each other in virtue of what they precisely are. A term, such as ‘white’, in 
being applied to a given receptacle, means that the receptacle is such and such without 
meaning that the receptacle is the very feature of being such and such. In other words, ‘white’ as 
applied to X means that X is white without meaning (or implying) that what X is is 
exhausted by its being white. In still other words, ‘white’ as applied to X means that X is 
white without meaning (or implying) that X is identical to what-it-is-for-something-to-be-
white. For, even if X and its whiteness were inseparable, being white is still different from 
being its receptacle X.  Thus, if ‘white’ signifies one, this does not entail that white is one 19
entity in account (or in being), as intended in the Parmenidean argument.20
And the same will hold for ‘being’. The term ‘being’, in being applied to a given 
receptacle X, means that the receptacle is a being (whatever that means) without meaning 
that the receptacle is the very feature of being a being (or being Being). In other words, 
‘being’ as applied to X means that X is a being without meaning (or implying) that what X 
is is exhausted by its being a being. In still other words, ‘being’ as applied to X means that 
X is a being without meaning (or implying) that X is identical to what-it-is-for-something-
to-be-a-being.
There have been discussions about whether Aristotle’s point depends on the specific 
nature of the term employed in his solution (‘white’) and/ or on the specific sort of 
predicative tie involved in the employment of that term. Thus, it has been argued that 
 Aristotle’s solution does not depend on employing the term ‘white’ in two different ways and thereby spoiling the 19
validity of the refutation etc. (for this view, see Bostock 2006, p. 108). Parmenides’ conclusion (as represented in the 
parallel argument) was that ‘white is one’. Aristotle’s point is that, in asserting the premise, Parmenides must already be 
committed to the distinction between two different ways of being white: being the property of being white, being 
whatever it is that happens to be white (the awkwardness of the expression is not my fault!).
 If Parmenides objected ‘but why should we apply the term to a receptacle?’, Aristotle would answer that, in refusing 20
to apply terms to things etc., Parmenides becomes a plant. Note that Aristotle does not need to be appealing to his 
preferred ontology (whatever that is) here: the distinction between being white and whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-
white does not imply that the latter item must be an Aristotelian substance. Aristotle’s point would equally apply even if 
the whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-white were a bunch of atoms, or an event. Actually, this is my reason for choosing 
the expression “whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-white”. 
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Aristotle’s point depends on employing accidental predicates such as ‘white’ in his 
solution, and that Aristotle’s next remark suggests that Parmenides could have avoided 
the fallacy (and deduced his intended conclusion) if he had resorted to essential 
predicates. As I will argue in detail by examining the next step (186a32-34ff.), Aristotle’s 
solution depends only on the nature of signifying as an operation which we do by 
employing terms to talk about things. Aristotle’s solution does not depend on accidental 
predicates such as ‘white’. His solution does exclude some class of statements – i.e., strict 
identity statements – but it does not exclude essential predicates in general. We might be 
misled into the opposite view by two factors: first, contexts in which Aristotle employs the 
notion of oneness in account as covering many sorts of essential predicates – it might be 
argued, for instance, that ‘human’ and ‘animal’ are one in account because the latter is an 
essential predicate of the former;  second, the contrast with sumbebekos in the next step of 21
Aristotle’s discussion. The latter factor will be discussed more extensively below. As for 
the former factor, I argue that essential predicates such as animal predicated of human (or 
human predicated of Socrates) are also affected by Aristotle’s solution. Animal is not one 
in account with human in the relevant sense. For being a human is not the same as being an 
animal, even if they are essentially related – see Posterior Analytics I.5, 74b34, where 
Aristotle explicitly says that being an equilateral triangle is not the same as being a triangle. 
Thus, being a human and being an animal count as two items in account – or two items in 
being.  Distinctness and multiplicity in account (or in being, 186a31) are not restricted to 22
accidental predication (even taking ‘accidental’ in the broad sense as equivalent to not-
included in the essence).  They also apply to at least some class of essential predicates. For 23
 See Quarantotto 2019, p. 99, for such a view.21
 Passages such as Metaphysics 1016a30-32 are perfectly compatible with my interpretation. To be sure, there is a way 22
in which it can be said that an isosceles triangle and an equilateral triangle are ‘one and the same’, because both are 
triangles. But their full logos and their being are different, so they must be counted as two (in being or in account), as 
we see also by another passage in the same chapter: ‘we count as more than one […] things of which the logos is not 
one’ (1016b9-11).  
 As Clarke (2019, p. 111, 123) has done.23
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any S and P such that S is essentially P but P is only part of S’s essence, there is no oneness 
in account (λόγῳ) or in being (τῷ εἶναι, which is the expression found in 186a31). 
Actually, as I will argue below, distinctness and multiplicity in account will only be 
avoided in strict identity statements.
How Parmenides could have avoided inconclusiveness (186a32-34)?
Aristotle’s next remark (186a32-34) sheds a light on Parmenides’ inconclusive step.  24
The gist of the remark is this: if, for Parmenides, the notion of signifying one (asserted in the 
premise) is to entail the notion of being one in account (as asserted in the conclusion), 
Parmenides must hold that ‘being’ can only be employed in making identity statements. In 
other words, he must hold that ‘being’, in being predicated of a given thing, means – about 
that thing it is predicated of (καθ᾽ οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, 186a33) – that that thing is not only 
one, but is exactly what-being-Being is and what-being-One is.25
Let me clarify how I take the crucial sentence in 186a32-34:  26
‘[32] ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἕν 
[33] σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθ᾽ οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ 
[34] ὄν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν’ (186a32-34).
 
 Aristotle’s remark in 186a32-34 is pointing to the ‘stronger assumptions’ needed in order to avoid Aristotle’s solution 24
(see Ross 1936, p. 474,  Charlton  1992, p. 60, Castelli 2018, p. 93, Clarke 2019, p. 110, 116, Quarantotto 2016, p. 226). 
This is why I do not agree with Gershenson & Greenberg (1962, p. 142-3, p. 150) when they break Aristotle’s 
discussion exactly at 186a32 and say that there are two independent attacks against the Eleatics (for a criticism of them, 
see Clarke 2019, p. 119, n32).
 Perhaps I can be happy with paraphrasing ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ just as what-being-is instead of what-being-Being-is. But 25
Aristotle usually employs a predicate expression ‘X’ in such a way that it stands for being X or having the feature named 
‘X’ (this is made explicit in Topics 133b8-9), with the result that ‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ X [ἐστι]’ will be equivalent to ‘that which 
being X is’. Therefore, if X is replaced with ‘being’ or ‘Being’ (the capital making allusion to the Eleatic notion), 
‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ ὄν [ἐστι]’ can be accurately paraphrased as what-being-Being is. However, in what follows, I will 
sometimes employ the expression ‘what being is’ instead of ‘what-being-Being is’ just for the sake of brevity.
 I am following what I have done in my Portuguese translation of Physics I-II, Angioni 2009.26
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First, I remark on what seems trivial: 
–  ‘ἕν’ (186a32), ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ and  ‘ὅπερ ἕν’ (186a33-34) are all complements of ‘σημαίνειν’;
– ‘τὸ ὄν’ (186a33) is the subject of ‘σημαίνειν’; 
Next, I address what is not so trivial and has been disputed: 
– the antecedent of the relative pronoun ‘οὗ’ (186a33) is not any of the expressions 
explicit in the surface of the text, but an implied pronoun (‘τοῦτο’ or ‘τόδε’, as is common 
in Greek), which stands for the thing to which ‘τὸ ὄν’ is applied as a predicate;  
Next, there are three important issues that are far from trivial. First, the nature and the 
appropriate range of the semantic notion expressed by ‘σημαίνειν’; second, the exact 
syntax compressed into the expression ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ (and ‘ὅπερ ἕν’); third, the specific 
employment of the expression ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ in this context as something related to Aristotle’s 
solution.  
‘σημαίνειν’ (in this context):
The semantic notion expressed by ‘σημαίνειν’ (in this context) ranges over terms 
employed as predicates applied to a given subject: it is the notion of meaning (or saying) 
something about the thing it is predicated of. And I stress that ‘σημαίνειν’ has been employed 
in the same way in 186a26.
My proposal does not collapse into saying that ‘σημαίνειν’ coincides with the notion of 
meaning  (whatever that notion is) as ranging over terms considered abstractly. Nor does it 
collapse into saying that ‘σημαίνειν ἕν’ stands for the notion of having just one meaning or 
having just one definition. I claim that ‘σημαίνειν’ ranges over terms, but not over terms 
abstractly considered as linguistic entities in a dictionary etc.; it ranges over terms qua 
employed in a given context to talk about a given thing. 
Let me develop this point. The term ‘white’ can be employed in several different 
contexts: (i) ‘white’ can be employed as equivalent to ‘whiteness’ in a sentence such as 
‘white is lighter than purple’; (ii) ‘white’ can be employed to point to a wall painted with 
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the colour white; (iii) ‘white’ can be employed to point to a body with pale skin; (iv) 
‘white’ can be employed to point to a voice which sounds clear and is easy to understand 
(106a25, 107a13). Now, it is not difficult to find definitions which capture exactly what is 
meant in each of those employments: 
(i) ‘white[ness] is a distinguishing colour’ (cf. 119a30); 
(ii) ‘“white” means having a surface coloured in such and such a way’ (cf. 107b1-2);
(iii) ‘“white” means having pale skin’; 
(iv) ‘“white” means clear sounding [or easy to understand]” (cf. 107b2).
It does not matter for my purposes whether this list mixes different sorts of definitions – 
real definitions of properties and nominal definitions of terms etc. Similarly, it does not 
matter whether those definitions are accurately formulated or not. Two remarks are 
relevant to develop my point. First, ‘σημαίνειν’ (as employed in 186a26, 33) covers the 
semantic relation between a given term, its meaning and the thing which is the target of the 
employment of the term. Second, the expression ‘σημαίνειν ἕν’ (as employed in 186a32-33) 
does not encode the notion of having just one meaning or one definition but a different 
semantic phenomenon, namely, that each employment of a term, being one employment, 
can mean only one thing about its subject.
 What ‘σημαίνειν’ captures in this context is the following idea. Terms (such as ‘white’) 
have, indeed, meanings, but their full function is to be employed to pick up things or to 
talk about things.  When we talk about a given thing employing a given term in a 
sentence, we talk about the thing according to one meaning of the term – e.g., if we employ 
the term ‘white’ to say something about a given thing, we are assuming what ‘white’ 
means as an important criterion to apply the term. But we are precisely talking about 
something, and this amounts to saying that:
– when we employ the term ‘white’ to talk about something, we are presupposing (and 
taking for granted) the distinction between the thing we are talking about and the property 
we are ascribing to that thing. In other words, we are presupposing (and taking for granted) 
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the distinction between, on the one hand, being the thing we are talking about and, on the 
other hand, having the property we are ascribing to that thing. To use the expressions 
employed by Aristotle in 186a28-31, we are presupposing (and taking for granted) the 
distinction between being white and being the whatever-it-is-that-happens to be white.27
Why do we presuppose this (and take it for granted)? Because the semantic operation 
named ‘σημαίνειν’ (in 186a26, 33) is exactly this: ‘σημαίνειν’ (in the relevant contexts) 
ranges over terms as employed to talk about a given thing; more specifically, performing 
the operation expressed by ‘σημαίνειν’ is equivalent to claiming that the thing at stake has 
the property which is picked out when we define the meaning of the term. Thus, saying 
that ‘white’ signifies (σημαίνει) something amounts to saying that ‘white’ picks out a given 
thing which allegedly has the property which defines what ‘white’ means.28
Accordingly, what ‘σημαίνειν ἕν’ captures in this context (186a26, 33) is the following 
idea: when we employ the term ‘white’ to talk about something, we mean that the thing 
we are exactly considering is white in just one way of being white (among the several ways 
of being white that the above definitions mark). For instance, if we say that: 
‘the wall is white’, 
we mean that the wall is painted with the colour white without meaning or implying 
either that the wall is at the same time whiteness, or has a pale skin, or sounds clearly etc. 
And we cannot mean more than one thing at the same time with the same token 
sentence or with the same token employment of the term ‘white’ (of course, jokes and 
puns apart etc.). 
 If someone objected: ‘but do I really need this presupposition?’, Aristotle’s reply would be: ‘You have an option: 27
become a plant!’. It would take me too long to argue that this distinction is intrinsically involved in Aristotle’s insights 
about what it is to use our expressions to λέγειν τι. But I do believe that this distinction is involved (for instance) in the 
main argument against the denial of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics 1006a18-26), and can also be 
tracked in Metaphysics 1052b1-14.
 I have employed the word ‘thing’ in my last paragraph (and elsewhere) in a very general way, as corresponding to 28
any item in any ontology. Indeed, ‘thing’ might refer to processes, events, Aristotelian substances or Democritean 
atoms, or whatever it is that is ‘out there’, as the target of our language. As I said in footnote 20, the distinction between 
being white and whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-white does not require Aristotle’s preferred ontology. The distinction 
is compatible with different ontologies. The most important point is that, in employing our language, we are conveying 
something about the world and, thereby, we are taking for granted that there is something ‘out there’, which, for 
instance, happens to be white.
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Thus, if we grant that the wall is white, we cannot accept someone arguing that:
– white (i.e., whiteness) is different from a wall (from definition (i));
– therefore, the wall (which is white) is different from a wall.29
In a similar way, if we grant that the Iliad is an epic cycle (κύκλος), we cannot accept 
someone arguing that:
– a circle (κύκλος) is a geometric figure;
– therefore, the Iliad (which is a κύκλος) is a geometric figure.30
The reason why we cannot accept those (sophistical) arguments is that, even if the terms 
involved have more than one meaning, one cannot mean more than one thing when one 
actually employs the term in a token sentence to talk about something. We are allowed to 
mean only one thing about the item the term is meant to pick out.
Thus, the expression ‘σημαίνειν ἕν’ in this context (186a26-7, 32-3) is not envisaging an 
abstract relation between the term ‘white’ and its (possible) meanings; consequently, the 
premise in the parallel argument is not equivalent to the claim that ‘white’ has only one 
meaning (and only one definition). Aristotle is considering a concrete relation between the 
term ‘white’ as employed in a given situation and what the term means in that particular 
situation, namely, what the term means about the thing it is predicated of in that particular 
situation.31
‘ὅπερ ὄν’: the full syntax of the expression:
The full syntax of what is compressed into the expressions ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ and ‘ὅπερ ἕν’ is 
this: ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ and ‘ὅπερ ἕν’ are elliptical for ‘τοῦτο ὅπερ ὄν ἐστι’ and ‘τοῦτο ὅπερ ἕν 
ἐστι’, where ‘ὄν’ and ‘ἕν’ are the subjects of the relative sentences and ‘ὅπερ’ is the 
complement of the relative sentences. Thus, ‘that which being is’ (and ‘that which one is’) 
 There is a similar point in Metaphysics 1007a8-20. See Angioni 2006, p. 64-66.29
 See Sophistical Refutations 171a9-11 and Posterior Analytics 77b31-33.30
 Charlton 1992, p. 60, has somehow hinted at the relevant point: ‘if to know what the word “f” means, is to know 31
what it would be for a thing to be f’. (However, I do not agree with Charlton’s ensuing remarks.)
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is, in my view, the more accurate translation. It is important to explain the syntax of the 
expression and the way in which its syntax allows Aristotle to employ the expression in 
the several ways he has employed it. Usually, scholars are prone to take ‘ὅπερ’ just as a 
shorthand for ‘essentially’ without explaining what is going on with the expression.  This 32
flattening interpretation has consequences when the expression is employed in more 
complex contexts. This will be clear, so I hope, in my next steps.
The expression ‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ ὄν [ἐστι]’ is just a particular case of the general pattern 
‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ X [ἐστι]’ or one of its abbreviated forms (where ‘X’ is replaceable with any 
term).  Now, the pattern is employed by Aristotle in several contexts to mark a specific 33
feature of essential predications, with the term ‘X’ playing the role of predicate applied to 
a given subject.  The best passage is Posterior Analytics I.22 (I use the letters ‘P’ and ‘S’ in 34
the translation to make the pronoun references easier to follow): 
‘Besides, items [i.e., predicates, P] signifying essence signify of what they are predicated 
of [i.e., subjects, S] that S is what exactly P is, or what exactly a particular sort of P is [ὅπερ 
ἐκεῖνο ἢ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο τι]; but the predicates which do not signify essence but are said of 
some other underlying subject which is neither what exactly P is nor what exactly a 
particular sort of P is, are accidental, e.g. white of human. For human is neither what 
exactly white is nor what exactly some white is [οὔτε ὅπερ λευκὸν οὔτε ὅπερ λευκόν τι’]
—but is surely animal; for a human is what exactly animal is.’ (83a24-30, my translation) 
 
 There are exceptions, such as Clarke 2019, p. 117. Other interpretations (such as Castelli 2018, p. 93-4) go in a 32
direction similar to mine, but I am not satisfied with the way they explain how the syntax of the expression encodes 
certain claims.
 Gershenson & Greenberg (1962, p. 143) have said that ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ (and ‘ὅπερ ἕν’) ‘occur very rarely in the Aristotelian 33
corpus’. However, one cannot ignore that ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ is a case of the expression ‘ὅπερ X’ (where X is replaceable with any 
term), which Aristotle has employed several times. 
 There are some exceptions. In the highly complicated context of Metaphysics 1030a3-5, the expression is in a sort of 34
metalinguistical register. The sentence ‘ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι’ (1030a4-5) is not saying that pale 
man is not essentially a [substantial] this, but is saying that the expression ‘pale man’ does not encode what a 
substantial this is, i.e., ‘pale man’ cannot be taken as an appropriate definiens of a substance. I have defended this view 
in Angioni 2014, p. 87-90. As for Posterior Analytics 89a35-6 (another highly controversial case), see my view in 
Angioni 2013, p. 273-279.
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 Thus, animal as predicated of human means (σημαίνει) that humans are that which 
[being an] animal strictly is, whereas white as predicated of human does not mean that 
humans are that which [being] white strictly is (83a28-30, cf. Metaphysics 1007a26-33). 
Aristotle employs the expression ‘ὅπερ X ’ in order to stress the relations holding between 
the items involved. The point of using the relative clause, with the pronoun ‘ὅπερ’ as the 
complement, is to stress that there is something which being an animal is (i.e., being a living 
thing capable of perceiving), so that, when animal holds of something S, its holding of S 
means that being S is essentially connected with what being an animal is. The point of using 
the emphatic pronoun ‘ὅπερ’ (instead of a mere relative pronoun ‘ὅ’) is to stress that 
animal, when predicated of S, is stating that the being for S does not consist in anything 
else significantly different from being an animal (cf. Metaphysics 1007a27). This is what 
signifying essence (83a24, 29-30), as an operation ranging over predicates qua predicates, 
amounts to. Aristotle’s point is not the mere ‘transitivity of predicates’ – for transitivity 
will hold for both sort of predicates under appropriate interpretations of them: thus, if 
being an animal is exactly being a perceptive living being, it will follow that humans are 
perceptive living beings; however, if being white is exactly having a surface with such and 
such a feature (cf. Topics 107b1-2), it will also follow that a human (who is white) has a 
surface with such and such a feature, with the result that white as predicated of humans 
means that humans have a surface with such and such a feature. Aristotle’s point is that 
humans, in being animals, can be said to be what animal is in a stronger way: being for 
humans is not something else significantly different from being an animal. In general 
terms, for any predicate E that signifies essence, being E either exhausts what it is for S to 
be what S is, or is at least an important part of it. But the same will not hold of whiteness. 
Humans, in being white, cannot be said to be exactly what being white is, for being white 
neither exhausts what is for human beings to be what they are, nor is an important part of 
it. 
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Now, the disjunction in my last sentence – which is based on ‘ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο ἢ ὅπερ 
ἐκεῖνο τι’ in 83a24-25 (cf. 83a27, 29) – is really important to understand Aristotle’s point 
against Parmenides. Indeed, for any essential predicate P, there are two options: if P is an 
essential predicate of S, then P either exhausts what it is for S to be S or is an important 
part of it. Aristotle does not always mark this distinction (and this has misled scholars), 
but sometimes he does (and 186a33-34 is ‘one of those times’). Thus, Aristotle is comfortable 
using the expression ‘S is [τοῦτο] ὅπερ P [ἐστι]’ when P is only an important part of what 
it is for S to be what S is. This is Aristotle’s usual way of talking about the genus in the 
Topics.  However, on the same conditions – I mean, when P is only an important part of 35
what it is for S to be what S is – Aristotle sometimes says that ‘S is [τοῦτο] ὅπερ P τι [ἐστι]’, 
where the indefinite adjective ‘τι’ means something like ‘of a given sort’ or ‘some’.  The 36
addition of the adjective ‘τι’ in the expression is decisive to mark that P is an essential 
predicate which does not exhaust the essence of S. By contrast, when P exhausts what it is 
for S to be S, Aristotle cannot use the expression ‘S is [τοῦτο] ὅπερ P τι [ἐστι]’. He can 
only say that ‘S is [τοῦτο] ὅπερ P [ἐστι]’. Actually, in some occurrences of the expression 
‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ P [ἐστι]’ with no addition of ‘τι’, the expression is pointing to what is the 
whole essence of the subject S.37
‘ὅπερ ὄν’ as used in Aristotle’s solution:
What is important for the present case is that Aristotle’s employment of ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ in 
186a33-34ff. is one of those times in which the expression stands for a predicate that 
exhausts what it is for S to be S. This amounts to saying that the expression ‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ 
ὄν [ἐστι]’, with no addition of ‘τι’, means – when applied to any subject – that the being of 
 See, for instance, 124a18. 35
 These are some occurrences: Metaphysics 1001a27; 1091b25, 27; 1045b1, 3-6, 23; Prior Analytics 49b7-8; Posterior 36
Analytics 83a6-7, 14.
 See Posterior Analytics 91a39. Note that, a few lines further, in 91b3, the expression ‘ὅπερ τι’ is used to mark the 37
case in which A is predicated of all B without being convertible with it, like animal is predicated of human (91b4-7).
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its subject is exhausted by being exactly what Being is. Therefore, applying the expression 
‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ ὄν [ἐστι]’ (or one of its abbreviated versions) to a given subject amounts to 
formulating a strong identity statement between that subject and what being (or, rather, 
Being) essentially is.  Now, this is significantly different from saying that a given subject is 38
essentially a being in the sense that being a being is an important part of its essence—and 
is also different from saying that S is exactly what being a [particular kind of] being is. Had 
Aristotle meant the last point, he would have employed the expression ‘ὅπερ ὄν τι’ 
instead of the expression ‘ὅπερ ὄν’ – for, just a few lines later (186b2, 9), ‘τι’ is employed 
exactly in the way I have highlighted: in 186b2, ‘ὄν τι’ has the force of ‘a [particular] being’ 
either in the sense of ‘a being of a particular kind’ or in the sense of ‘a particular token 
being’, so that Aristotle’s point (in 186b2, but not in 186a33-34) is that it would not be 
possible for what-Being-is to be the being of a particular kind or a particular token being.  39
Therefore, the view that ‘being’ can only be employed in making strong identity 
statements about Being itself is exactly what Parmenides would need to avoid the 
inconclusiveness of his argument.  Parmenides would not have improved his argument if 40
he had said that ‘being’ signifies one merely in the sense of being a (non-exhaustive) 
essential predicate of any subject. For, in that case, being S and being what being is (‘[τοῦτο] 
ὅπερ ὄν [ἐστι]’) would still count as two items in account, even if they are essentially 
related – in the same way as being an equilateral triangle and being a triangle are not the 
same, even if they are essentially related. In order to avoid the inconclusiveness of his 
argument, Parmenides must have resorted to the claim that ‘being’ signifies one in the 
stronger sense of exhausting what being is for any subject it is applied to. In that case, 
 Pace Spangler 1979, p. 98, who believes that Aristotle’s employment of the expression in that passage is conveying 38
the idea that being is a genus. For a different view, see Castelli 2018, p. 93-4.
 Similarly, at the end of the chapter, Aristotle asks: ‘for who understands “being itself”, excepts as being what exactly 39
a given being is?’ (τίς γὰρ µανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ µὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι; 187a8-9). The expression is a little bit 
different: the definite article ‘τό’ goes with the infinitive ‘εἶναι’, and ‘[τοῦτο] ὅπερ ὄν τι [ἐστι]’ works as the 
complement of the infinitive ‘εἶναι’, but the internal syntax of the expression is the same. Aristotle is suggesting that the 
emphatic expression ‘αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν’ can only be understood with the force of ‘being what a particular being is’.
 This is stronger than ‘essence monism’ (as depicted in Clarke 2018, p. 68).40
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there will be no distinction between being Being itself and being S (playing the role of 
whatever-it-is-that-happens-to-be-Being). Only in this case the subject S would not count 
as distinct in account (or in being) from Being itself. But such a claim amounts to saying 
that ‘being’ could only be employed in one strong identity statement about itself, so that 
predication will be impossible.  41
A quick survey of the consequences (186a34-186b12): 
In fact, that predication will be impossible is (among other things) what Aristotle 
intends to show in his next steps (186a34-b12): for Parmenides, anything different from 
this strong view about Being signifying one would lead to inconsistency. The gist of 
Aristotle’s discussion is this: let ‘being’ signify something not in the way suggested in 
186a32-34 (i.e., not as meaning that what it is applied to is the same as what-being-Being-
is): then, something which is not being will be (186a34-b4); and Being itself will end up 
collapsing into non-being (186b4-12). 
In general lines, Aristotle’s discussion is as follows. Suppose that ‘being’ does not 
signify, about X (= the thing it is applied to), that X is what-Being-is – instead, suppose 
that ‘being’ just accompanies (συμβέβηκε, 186a35, more on this expression below) that to 
which it is applied without being one with it – this is what Aristotle expresses with ‘τὸ 
γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται’ (186a34-35) and ‘ἕτερον γὰρ τοῦ 
ὄντος’ (186a35-b1). The conclusion is stated at 186a35: ‘that to which being is applied as a 
predicate will not be’ (ῷ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσται), for it will be different from being. 
However, if X is that to which being is applied (or if it is acceptable to apply ‘being’ to it), 
then X somehow is: for, if X were nothing at all, it would not be there as something to 
which ‘being’ could be applied. Now, if X somehow is (premise assumed for a 
 For a different view, see Clarke 2019, p. 119-120. 41
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Parmenidean reductio), then it follows that ‘there will be some being which is not being’ – a 
conclusion stated with an ironical surprise (marked by the particle ‘ἄρα’ at 186b1).  42
Now, in order to avoid this road of contradiction (‘there will be some being which is not 
being’), Parmenides should have taken ‘being’ as meaning, about the thing it is applied to, 
that the thing is what-being-Being-itself is – as Aristotle has suggested in 186a32-34. But the 
suggestion is tantamount to saying that ‘ὄν’ is not liable to be instantiated in different sorts 
of particular beings: ‘for it is not possible for it to be a certain being’ (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄν τι 
αὐτὸ εἶναι, 186b2). Consequently, let Parmenides get rid of the misleading X: ‘ὄν’ can only 
be one, identical with itself – and it can only be employed in one identity statement, ‘Being 
is Being’ (or ‘What-Being-is is What-Being-is’). Indeed, ‘it will not be possible for what-
Being-is to be applied to anything else’ (οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, 
186b1-2).43
In 186b4-12, Aristotle develops the second part of the issue: Parmenides’s view will not 
allow anything to be predicated of Being. For predication would entail non-identity 
(between the subject and the predicate) and non-identity would imply multiplicity. But 
there is no room here to examine that line of discussion.
Being as a ‘συμβεβηκὸς’:
What about the ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ terminology in the passage 186a34-b1? If my 
interpretation of 186a32-34 is right, ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ must cover any predicative relation in 
which subject and predicate are two in account – the only exception will be the sort of 
identity statement in which there is not even an intensional distinction between the subject 
and the predicate.
 For the ironical use of ‘ἄρα’, see Angioni 2009, p. 106. Quarantotto 2016 has been finely sensitive to Aristotle’s 42
humour in these highly abstract discussions.
 According to Aristotle’s solution, Parmenides’ claim is stronger than Predicational Monism – i.e.,  that ‘each being 43
can only be one kind of thing’ (O’Connor, 2017, p. 37) – or ‘essence monism’ (Clarke 2019, p. 110, 114); his claim is 
that it is not possible for any particular being to be, for it will be different from Being itself. This is ‘entity monism’: 
only Being is.
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This is the passage:
‘[34] τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς 
[35] λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσται’ (186a34-35).
On standard interpretations of ‘συμβεβηκὸς’, the passage would be translated as 
follows:
‘For an accident is said of an underlying subject, consequently, what it is an accident of 
will not be’.    
See, for instance, how Ross (1936, p. 340) has taken the point in his analysis of the 
passage: ‘it will not do to suppose that being is an accident; for then what it is an accident 
of will not be’.  On this interpretation, Aristotle seems to suggest that, if the Parmenidean 44
view is rejected, we will be left with ‘being’ as an accidental predicate. Would Aristotle be 
committed to that consequence, namely, that ‘being’ is an accidental predicate of whatever 
it is predicated of (except Being itself)? 
Some scholars suggest that Aristotle’s solution (186a23-32) is ascribing to Parmenides 
the view that being is an accidental predicate – for only accidental predicates, they claim, 
involve the distinction in being (or in account) between attribute and that which receives 
the attribute.  Now, I have argued that the distinction in being (or in account) needed for 45
Aristotle’s solution also works with essential predicates that do not exhaust what it is for 
their subjects to be what they are. Even if there is an aspect on which human and animal can 
be said to be one in account, it is clear that being an animal is not the same as being a human. 
Now, given that Aristotle’s point in 186a32-b1 seems to involve an exhaustive opposition 
between identity statements (‘signifying what-Being exactly is’) and being a συμβεβηκὸς of 
its subject, my proposal seems to imply that even non-identity essential predicates (such as 
 See also Bostock 2006, p. 109.44
 See Quarantotto 2019, p. 97-8; for a different view, see Clarke 2019, p. 115.45
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animal attributed to human) will be covered by ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ as used in the passage. I will 
now explain why I am perfectly comfortable with that.
The term ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ is usually taken in the sense of contingent predicate – namely, the 
sort of accidental predicate that can indifferently belong or not belong to a given subject in 
different circumstances (as defined in Topics 102b6-7). Now, many scholars do not believe 
that ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ must be taken in that way in 186a34. Most translators have resorted to 
alternative options (for instance, Hardie & Gaye: ‘attribute’; Charlton: ‘that which 
supervenes’) and Clarke (2019, p. 111, 123) has remarked that ‘συμβεβηκὸς’ can be taken 
in the broad sense of attribute which is not included in the essence of its subject. My 
proposal goes even further in this same direction.
I do not believe that ‘συμβεβηκός’ is taken in a deviated or exceptional sense in 186a34.  I 46
have developed my views about ‘συμβεβηκός’ elsewhere, so I will only retrieve the most 
important points here.  Aristotle uses the word ‘συμβεβηκός’ (as well as the verb 47
‘συμβέβηκε’ with dative) in several ways, but there is an overall coherence in all his uses. 
First, the word ‘συμβεβηκός’ covers a relation which seems to be dyadic (with only two 
relata) but always pressuposes a third item which gives a parameter under which the 
relation is being taken. Second, the word is highly context-sensitive: it has a core meaning, 
but defined in very general terms, such that more specific contexts of application imprint 
different forces to it. Third, the core meaning can be characterised with two conditions: one 
of the relata (let it be X) is said to be a συμβεβηκός of the other (let it be Y) when, first, X 
accompanies Y and, second, X is not the most important factor for Y according to the aspect 
or parameter under which Y is being considered in a given context. But, as I will show, there are 
many contexts, each with a different parameter. Fourth, the most traditional notion of 
συμβεβηκός, which covers a relation of contingency between X and Y, is found only in 
one subset of Aristotle’s employment of the expression. Fifth, and most importantly, the 
 I do not agree with Gershenson & Greenberg (1962, p. 143-4, 148-9), who take the occurrences of ‘συµβεβηκός’ in 46
Physics I.3 as depicting ‘precisely the meaning of this word for the Eleatics’ (p. 149).  
 See Angioni 2019, p. 362-8 for the general story.47
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employment of ‘συμβεβηκός’ covering the notion of contingency gives us the (wrong) 
impression that the relation is strictly dyadic with no presupposed parameter at all – but 
that impression only arises because the aspect or parameter under which Y is being 
considered in those contexts is Y itself, i.e. (unpacking what that means for Aristotle in the 
relevant contexts), Y’s being what it essentially is in itself. The same misleading 
impression holds for Aristotle’s employment of ‘συμβεβηκός’ in the broad sense of a 
predicate not included in the essence of its subject; but there is an implied parameter, 
which is what the subject essentially is in itself.48
Thus, Aristotle says that being seated is a συμβεβηκός of Socrates because (i) being 
seated accompanies Socrates at a given circumstance, but (ii) being seated is not important 
for Socrates according to the aspect or parameter under which Socrates is being considered 
in that context – i.e., being seated is not important for Socrates’ being essentially what he 
is. Now, according to that same aspect or parameter, Aristotle cannot say that being a man 
is a συμβεβηκός of Socrates: for, although (i) being a man accompanies Socrates (actually, 
in all circumstances), (ii) being a man is indeed important for Socrates according to that 
aspect – i.e., being a man is important for Socrates’ being essentially what he is. But let us 
change the parameter: Socrates now is being considered as curable, i.e., as liable to the expert 
intervention of a physician (cf. Metaphysics 981a18-20). Then, being a man becomes a 
συμβεβηκός of Socrates. For, according to that aspect or parameter, being a man is far 
from being the most important factor for Socrates, even if being a man is an essential 
predicate of his and, furthermore, a condition sine qua non presupposed in his being liable 
to the expert intervention of a physician. Thus, Aristotle is very comfortable in saying that 
being a man συμβέβηκε to Socrates (981a19-20), and this language is far from implying 
that man is an accidental predicate of Socrates – nor need we say that such an employment 
 A further clarification: when Aristotle calls the attribute 2R a συµβεβηκός καθ᾽ αὑτό of the triangle, what he means 48
must be analysed in two steps: (i) first, ask whether the attribute is or is not included in the essence of its subject (if it is 
not included, it is a συµβεβηκός); (ii) second, ask whether the attribute is or is not explained by the essence of its 
subject (if it is, call it a συµβεβηκός καθ᾽ αὑτό). 
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of the terms departs or deviates from their normal meaning. For the core definition still 
holds of this case.
This story could be fleshed out with more examples and details. However, as I have 
developed it in several places, I can allow myself to be short here. 
Thus, what is Aristotle doing in 186a34-b1? He is not saying or implying that, if we 
reject Parmenides’ view that ‘being’ can only be used in one strict identity statement, we 
would be left with taking ‘being’ as an accidental predicate either in the sense of a 
contingent predicate that could cease to be true about its subject in a different 
circumstance, or in the sense of an attribute not included in the essence of its subject. The 
first view will be odd, indeed. ‘Being’ is the most trivial predicate, in the sense that, at least 
on a given interpretation, it cannot be false about any being at all. We might even dare to 
say that being is a necessary predicate of every being that exists – ‘X is a being’ will be 
necessarily true of any existing X etc.  Many subtleties could be addressed here, but it is 49
enough for my purposes to stress that contingency or non-essentiality of the predicate 
‘being’ is not the central issue at stake in 186a34-b1. 
What is the issue, then, when Aristotle suggests that ‘being’ as predicated of a particular 
being is a συμβεβηκὸς of that particular being? Aristotle is implying that being a being is 
not the most important factor for any particular being’s being what it is. Take a horse as an 
example of a particular being. Aristotle might comfortably say that being a being is a 
συμβεβηκὸς of horses, for, although (i) being a being accompanies horses in all 
circumstances, (ii) it is not the most important factor for horses’ being essentially what 
they are. Similarly, picture a physician being called to attend an emergency and asking 
while she runs to it: ‘tell me more about the patient’. What the physician wants is to 
consider the relevant features of the patient qua patient, which are strictly important for 
her expert intervention. It would not do to answer the physician with this: ‘the patient is a 
human being’. Things will not improve if someone insists: ‘Well, you know, the patient is 
 For a similar point, see Clarke 2019, p. 87.49
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essentially a human being’. Given that the expert intervention of the physician is the 
relevant parameter implied in this context, being essentially a human being is indeed a 
sumbebekos of the patient, for it does not qualify among the most important features of the 
patient qua patient. Similarly, even if there is some aspect on which it is correct to say that 
a horse is essentially a being, being essentially a being qualifies as a sumbebekos of the 
horse if we are interested in what makes it a horse – being essentially a being does not 
qualify among the most important features of the horse qua horse.
A possible objection to my proposal is that ‘συμβεβηκός’ is explicitly used in the next 
section of the chapter (which starts at 186b14) both in the sense of contingent predicate 
and in the specific sense of ‘συμβεβηκός καθ᾽ αὑτό’ (non-included in the essence of its 
subject). There is no room here to discuss the argument starting at 186b14. But I argue that 
the context of 186a23-b12 is really different from the context of 186b14-35. Scholars are 
prone to conflate two different issues: on the one hand, the (ultimately sophistical) 
employment of the same expression with different meanings in a given argument in order 
to produce a false semblance of validity; on the other hand, the employment of the same 
expression with different meanings (or different referents, or different forces) within a 
short string of sentences. No one is allowed to conclude that the Iliad is a geometric figure 
from the premises that the Iliad is a κύκλος and that a κύκλος is a geometric figure. 
However, this gives us no ground to jump to the claim that, if a given expression is 
employed with different meanings (or different referents, or different forces) within a short 
string of sentences, then the validity of the argument is lost. One still has to prove that the 
short string of sentences at stake is tantamount to one and the same argument as the 
sophistical one about the Iliad. Actually, Aristotle has many times employed the same 
expression with different meanings (or different referents, or different forces) within a 
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short string of sentences without damaging the validity of his arguments. It happens that a 
short string of sentences can pack several arguments.50
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